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1 The computable mind.  
Be it through a variety of authors from  or through various philosophical and 
psychological paradigms,  one of the dominant concepts used in most contemporary 
theories of mind and cognition is the concept representation.  
Representation is one of the most central concepts in cognitive science: 
there is no cognition without reprcesentation, and no cognitive science either” 
(Billman 1998: 658) 
The main classical definition of this semiotic concept stems from the classical 
medieval formula Aliquid stat pro aliquo:1 
 Signum est quod se ipsum sensui et praeter se aliquid animo ostendit) 
(Augustine 1975, 86).  
Poinsot’s, one of the main influent late medieval professor defined representation in 
terms of “ being present again but under a new form. ” (Poinsot, TS, II, q 1, 696b17-30) 
It is such a definition that Brentano referred to when he talked of the scholastic 
definition of representation. But surely the most classical and often quoted definition comes 
from Peirce: 
A sign or representamen is something which stands to somebody, for 
something in some respect or capacity. (Peirce 1960 2. 228)   
In contemporary cognitive sciences, under different lexical clothing (symbol, 
information, or, sign, signal i, symbol, proxies, etc. ) we find this same conceptual 
definition. (i. e. the stand for relation). And one of most classical one is given by Marr.  
We are dealing with information -processing machines, and the way such 
machines work is by using symbols to stand for things to represent 
things"(Marr 1982: 21)  
And it was reformulated in a hundred other ways by so many authors:  
Representation is simply another term to refer to a structure that 
designates. (Newell 1980 :17) 
« By representational system (RS) I shall mean any system whose function 
is to indicate how things stand with respect to some other object»2(Dreske 
1988: 52)  
                                                 
1 In fact the real expression seem to have been “suppositio stat pro aliquo” see Karl Bühler: Sprachtheorie, Jena 1934: 40 (rpt. 
Stuttgart 1982); R. Jakobsen: Essais de linguistique générale, Paris 1963 
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In contemporary cognitive sciences, many researchers have recognized three 
important explanatory values to the concept of representation: The first one lies in the 
semiotic property of a representation implicit in the “stand for” expression of the definition. 
It is this property that allows cognition to be a set of intentional states that is: states that are 
not to be taken for themselves but for what they are “about “. The second lies in its material 
independence: that is: its nature can be explained independently of the material vehicle in 
which a representation can be implemented. Finally the third explanatory value lies in its 
functional role. It is by this property, that representations are understood as cognitive 
“states” that can be operated upon. Although all tree properties are important, they have 
raised many debates in philosophy and cognitive sciences. In this paper, we shall mainly 
focus on the functional role, although, as we shall see later, it is not without relation to the 
semantic and material dimensions. 3 
As it is well known, Fodor has been one the main defender of a representational 
theory of mind. He has defended the intentional status or representation but, more 
importantly, he has given a specific formulation to their functional role. A formulation that 
opened up the computational model of cognition.  
 If a mental process can be functionally defined as an operation on symbols, 
there is a Turing machine capable of carrying out the computation. (Fodor 
1981, 130, ) 
 In this paradigm, cognition is seen as a sort of machine where 
representations are “computed”: Cognition operates on representations like a 
Turing machine. And the brain is a special type of physical instantiation of this 
machine.  
 
Refusal of the representationnalist approach.  
Through the years, there has been a profusion of critics4 of this model. Many have 
insisted on the limits of this computational model of cognition (and mind). It is strictly a 
“syntactic” model of the mental operations on representation ( signs, signal or symbols) 
and it has no explanation on the semantics of these symbols.  
Computation is just interpretable symbol manipulation ; cognition isn’t 
(Harnad 1994:1) 
Hence, this computational model cannot explain basic mental operations be it 
perception, categorization, or more deeply consciousness. As Putnam underlines it : It is a 
not well thought out model.  
« Materialist are committed to the view that a human being is- at least 
metaphorically a machine. It is understandable that the notion of a Turing 
machine might be seen as just a way of making this materialist idea precise. 
Understandable, but hardly well thought out. (Putnam 1992: 4) 
                                                 
 
3 There are many understandings of what is a “ functional role” . In this paper, we shall keep to a very 
general understanding: The functional dimension pertains to the description of the functional processes . 
And it is precisely the nature of this process that it the theoretical question explored in this paper . And 
depending on the understanding of what is the nature of this process follows specific understandings of the 
“ role” , itself, if not its causal role.  
44 Among these critics: Block 1981, Putnam 1992, Maudlin 1989, Mellor 1989, Searle, (1992) Penrose 
1994, van Gelder 1993 Port and Van Gelder 1997, Wright 1995, Horst 1996, Copeland 2000, Fetzer 2001 
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It cannot explain neither the emergence nor the acquisition of representations 
themselves. For some5this meant that the concept of representation itself is inadequate for 
modeling cognition.  
 It is the concept of representation, which is insufficiently sophisticated. 
(Van Gelder 1993 : 6).  
 Representation is the wrong unit of abstraction in building the bulkiest 
parts of intelligent systems. (Brooks R. A. 1991: 396).  
We are not building representations at all! (Thelen et Smith 1994 : 338).  
However, some others researchers have hinted elsewhere. Maybe the concept of 
representation is not the problem. Maybe it is the concept of computation itself that is 
inadequate. And in this line of thought, a first type of such critics claims that this concept 
of computation cannot deal with the complexity of mind and cognition.  
That the kind of activity involved in the execution of mundane procedures 
seems to involve thinking yet reflects a class of effective procedures which does 
not qualify as Turing-computable. " (Fetzer 2001:116) 
Human intuition and insight... cannot be reduced to any set of 
computational rules. (Penrose, Shadows of the Mind: 65 
A second type of critics more radical claims that it is the concept of computation 
itself that is problematic and our understanding of it should be requestionned:  
... the classical Turing paradigm may no longer be fully appropriate to 
capture all features of present-day computing. - J. van Leeuwen and J. 
Wiedermann 2000: 22 
It this paper, our interest is to explore this second type of critics which invites a 
revisiting of the concept of computation itself. We aim to see how this revisiting has an 
impact on the representational aspect of cognition.  
2. The computable 
Although the concept of computation seams intuitively clear, its real meaning is not 
as transparent as we may think. Although the Latin word “computare” has been 
traditionally used by many philosophers for talking about the rationalization process of 
mind, the modern meaning of computation takes its source in the enquiry into the question 
of calculus as explored from Descartes, Leibniz, Peano, Dedekind up to Hilbert, Godel, 
Church. Etc. But it is only with Turing, if not with Kleene that the term “computation” 
itself has been used and accepted in its contemporary sense: a process of effective 
procedure for solving arithmetic problems. And its main understanding has been given 
through synthesis of two mathematical thesis: the Church thesis and the Turing thesis.  
The Church thesis : 1938 « Every effectively calculable function (effectively 
decidable predicate) are is general recursive. "  
The Turing Thesis is:… “ every intuitively computable function is computable 
by an abstract automata”  
These two related thesis form a unified thesis called the Church-Turing thesis (CTT). 
And the usual understanding of this later thesis was extended in such a way as to make the 
concept of computation practically synonymous with a set of other interrelated concepts 
                                                 
5 See Winograd et Flores 1986 ; Moravec,1988 ; Varela, 1988 ; Chalmers 1996; Port and Van Gelder, 1995; 
Petitot 1985; Scott-Kelso 1995; Brooks, 1991 ; Franklin, 1995 ; etc.)  
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such as decidable sentences, recursive function, effective procedures, algorithms, 
programs, Post production, markovian systems, etc.  
But we must be careful on the formulation of this CTT. Strictly speaking this thesis 
does not declare that the preceding terms are synonymous. It says only that these terms 
have and identical reference, that is, they are equivalent from an extensional point of view.  
« The same class of partial functions (and of total functions can be obtained 
in each case (Rogers 1987:39) 
Still, the union the Church thesis and the Turing thesis have given the traditional 
accepted definition of computation.  
Recently some historians of mathematics and finer grained mathematicians have 
come to raise doubts on the synonymicity or intensional identity of these various terms 
contained in the Church-Turing thesis. In fact, there are raising questions about the real 
content of this famous thesis iself. For the Church-Turing thesis does not ware its meaning 
on its sleeve, as Israel, paraphrasing Ayers, cogently declares : 
This Church-Turing thesis hardly wears its meaning on its sleeve and 
differing conceptions (and misconceptions) of computation may lie behind 
what seems a widespread consensus. (Israel 2002 : 181)  
In other words, the meaning computation is not as evident as one may think. And 
some believe that we should requestion the adequacy of this thesis for understanding 
present day computing.  
The classical Turing paradigm may no longer be fully appropriate to 
capture all features of present-day computing. ”- (J. van Leeuwen, J. 
Wiedermann 2000: 22) 
It makes no sense to point to Turing computation as the `only true model 
of computation'. Rather, there are many models of computation, each making 
sense in its own domain.. Stannett 2006: 16 
More so, some see the classical theory of computation as a failed program :It is a 
« last vestige of a failed program »(Cleland 2007) 
Although highly radical, these critics require attention in the context of a theory of 
cognition and mind. They attack directly the foundations of the computational 
representational model of cognition.  
3-The computable and the non-computable.  
Even if the CTT maintains an extensional identity between the various terms defining 
the concept of computation, there are some important differences between these terms that 
invite us into a deeper understanding of what is “computation”. Indeed, the semantic field 
of this concept contains many conceptual differences that, often are at the heart of 
mathematical debates over what is computation. But, as we shall see, the differences are 
not easy to unveil. One place where we can look to find these minute differences is in the 
definition given by the original creators of the theory of the opposite concepts of 
computation, that is : in the non decidable, the non algorithm and the non computational, 
etc...  
For instance, Hilbert, as Davis says, had though that he could settle all mathematical 
problems thought decidable procedures:  
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“ it seemed clear to Hilbert that with the solution of this problem, the 
Entscheidungsproblem, it should be possible, at least in principle, to settle all 
mathematical questions in a purely mechanical manner. (Davis 1965, p. 108)” 
But he did not manage to prove this for all arithmetic. He was then confronted to 
radical undecidability of a problem that he reformulated in terms of Entscheidung problem 
that is : is arithmetic really decidable?  
The same goes for Godel and Church. One of the main contribution of these 
mathematicians on the question of computation was in a sense a negative one. Although 
both deepened the concept of calculus with the concepts of recursivity, equational calculus 
and lambda calculus, Godel’s main contribution was to give a proof that arithmetic was 
not-decidable that is : it is incomplete6. Later, Church proved again that this Entsheidung 
problem could not be recursively definable or more technically or receive a lambda 
defintion. These positions were formulated as thesis, not as theorems.  
 More so, as Davis (1982) 7and Sieg (1994), underlined it, Gödel was not convinced 
that recursivity was an adequate definition of “ effective procedure” or decidability. 
Something was missing: For Godel more specification was needed on what exactly should 
be understood by recursion as means for calculation.  
Turing’s own contribution on this topic is most interesting. In the continuity of Gödel 
and Church, he presented in 1934 a model that translated what were only “intuitive” steps 
in the recursion model into specific mechanical procedures. These mechanical procedures 
were realized in what he called an “abstract automata". This automata, as we all know 
could itself be realized in a physical machine incorporating a moving tapes on which 
symbols taken from a finite set of symbols can be written or erased according to a finite set 
of instructions. And Turing called the function (see Sieg, 1994 :95) that these automata 
could process “ a computable function” “ human calculating with a pencil and paper” and 
he named these humans “computor ”. 8 But it is only later that Kleene called theses 
operations :”effective elementary operations of “ computation”. 9 
 It may be a surprise for many that the real interest of Turing was not to give a 
definition of what makes a function computable but what make it not computable. One 
must remember that at that time Turing, as much Church was entangled in the Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorem. And as Hodge says, his answer to this question would allow him, 
                                                 
6 Let K be any recursive consistent class of FORMULAS; then the SENTENTIAL FORMULA stating that K 
is consistent is not K-PROVABLE ... (Godel 1931 p. 614) 
 
7. Gödel did not think of general recursiveness as a rigorous explication of effective calculability… 
The conjecture stated there only refers to the equivalence of ‘finite (computation) procedure’ and 
‘recursive procedure’. However, I was, at the time of these lectures, not at all convinced that my 
concept of recursion comprises all possible recursions; …(Davis 1982:8) 
 
8 A man provided with paper, pencil, and rubber, and subject to strict discipline, is in effect a 
universal machine (Turing 1948:9). 
 
9 Turing's machine concept arises from a direct effort to analyze computation procedures as we 
know them intuitively into elementary operations. Turing argued that repetitions of his elementary 
operations would suffice for any possible computation.\ For this reason, Turing computability 
suggests the thesis more immediately than the other equivalent notions and so we choose it for our 
exposition."( Kleene, 1967: 233) 
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- he hoped- just as Godel and Church had done before him, to prove the unsolvability of to 
the Entsheidungsproblem.  
…a definitive negative answer to Hilbert's Entscheidungsproblem. Turing 
showed it possible to give unambiguous definitions of real numbers which are 
not computable (Hodges 2000)  
And most importantly, it was this problem of the unsolvabilty of mathematical 
problems through these mecanical procedures that he translated into to his own view of it: 
the halting problem which one the most important non-computable problem.  
In summary, the specific positive contribution of Turing gave more precisions to the 
concept of calculabiliy and recursion. It translated concepts that were still too intuitive into 
a set of atomic, local and structured procedures. And because of these procedures could 
become mechanical, they hence were effective. Godel saw this as the specific contribution 
of Turing.  
 
With this concept one has for the first time succeeded in giving an absolute 
definition of an interesting epistemological notion, i. e., one not depending on 
the formalism chosen. In all other cases, such as demonstrability, one has been 
able to define them only relative to a given language... For the concept of 
computability, however, although it is merely a special kind of demonstrability 
or decidability, the situation is different. (Gödel 1990a: 150) 
 
But this contribution, opened up a new problem: if computation is to be defined as 
set of “ well defined effective procedures” even more “ of “mechanical procedures”, what 
does it mean to process non-computable functions: a question which Godel himself 
considered a very complex and fundemental problem for mathematics.  
It must be admitted that the construction of a well-defined procedure which 
could actually be carried out (and would yield a nonrecursive number-theoretic 
function) would require a substantial advance in our understanding of the basic 
concepts of mathematics. (Gödel 1990b; 308).  
 
 The Turing and Post solutions.  
How do you deal with non-computable functions? Answering this queston is a 
Pandora’s box and it is at the heart of the enrichment of contemporary theory of 
computation. Here we can only have a peek in the Turing and Post solutions to this question 
and relate it to our problem of cognition and representation. Others (Chatin, Da Costa, 
Doria , 2012)  explore other  original paths but the relation to cognition is not yet that 
evident . 
Turing’s technical answer to the processing of non-computable functions was to 
transform his classical machine “ abstract automata” (A-Machine) into a machine (O-
machine) that could be assisted by some Oracle: 10 But as many commentators have 
                                                 
10 A Turing oracle machine (o-machine) is a Turing machine with an extra \read only” tape, called 
the oracle tape, upon which is written the characteristic function of some set A (called the oracle), 
and whose symbols cannot be printed over. The old tape is called the work tape and operates just as 
before. The reading head moves along both tapes simultaneously. … The Turing oracle program eP  
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underlined it, Turing introduced this concept or Oracle with practically no details in a tiny 
and obscure place of his 1939 paper.  
Technically translated: an oracle is a machine that is in itself a computable function 
(often it is a characteristic function). And, when it is necessary, it will intervene in the 
processing of another machine (called the A-machine) so that a solution can be found.  
An oracle machine (o-machine): roughly a Turing a-machine which could 
interrogate an \oracle” (external database) during the computation. (Soares 
2009: 23)  
 In this manner, this O-machine can process any non-computable function. It allows 
any computation to halt. Still later on, in 1944, Turing slowly moved towards a more formal 
definition of the oracle: He saw it as sort of meta-computable function that could check 
lower order functions. As Turing says in a letter to Newman: 
One imagines different machines allowing different sets of proofs, and by 
choosing a suitable machine one can approximate 'truth' by 'provability' better 
than with a less suitable machine, and can in a sense approximate it as well 
as you please ( Gandy 1954 : 22)  
Slightly later, he proposed that certain non-computable functions of a lower level 
could be solved in a logic of one degree higher. And it seems that he thought that this would 
counter the Godel theorem. A proposition that it seems he later abandoned. More so, that 
Feferman (1962) proved incorrect.  
A general incompleteness theorem for recursive progressions... would have 
been dramatic proof of the far-reaching extent of incompleteness phenomena. 
However, the situation has not turned out in this way. Feferman 1962: 258  
Still, even if these propositions were proven later to be incorrect, they opened up the 
idea that non-computability could be relative. That is : computation and non-computation 
are not absolute notions : More profoundly there seems to be “degrees of solvability” in 
proof constructions or “effective reducibility” 11as Post later in 1944  
For unsolvable problems the concept of reducibility leads to the concept 
of degree of unsolvability, two unsolvable problems being of the same degree 
of unsolvability if each is reducible to the other, one of lower degree of 
unsolvability than another if it is reducible to the other, but that other is not 
reducible to it, of incomparable degrees of unsolvability if neither is 
reducible to the other. (E. L. Post 1944: 289) 
“… This transformed the notion of computability from an absolute notion 
into a relative one that would lead to entirely new developments and 
eventually to vastly generalized forms of recursion theory”. (Feferman 
2006:1204) 
Unfortunately, as Soares (2009) underlines it, these concepts of oracle and relative 
computability, when they were published, were not really well understood and received12. 
                                                 
takes some oracle A and defines a partial A-computable functional 
𝑒
𝐴 (𝑥) = 𝑦 }” Soares :2009: 
21 
 
11 In 1944 Emil Post [20] took it as his basic notion for a theory of degrees of unsolvability, crediting Turing with the result that for 
any set of natural numbers there is another of higher degree of unsolvability. This transformed the notion of computability from an 
absolute notion into a relative one that would lead to entirely new developments and eventually to vastly generalized forms of 
recursion theory. Feferman 2006: 1204 
12 There is a relation here to be explored with Kripke’s possible worlds. 
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At that time, it was mainly the Church-Turing thesis that retained attention because of the 
emerging spectaculer computer technology.  
It is surprising that so much attention has been paid to the Church-Turing 
Thesis. Over the last seventy years and so little to the Post-Turing Thesis 6. 1 
on relative reducibility, (Soares 2009: 23) 
It was only later that these concepts were seriously reintroduced. But only a few 
mathematicians saw the importance of the concept of relative unsolvability for an adequate 
theory of computation.  
Still Rogers in 1967 wrote on the subject still using the Turing original definition of 
1939. Even now, it seems not very well explored (see Odifreddi 1989, Lerman 1983). 
Certain researchers such as Cooper 2004, and mainly Soare (2009) insist more and more 
on the importance of this question of non-computation.  
The subject (of computation) is primarily about incomputable objects not 
computable ones, and has been since the 1930's. The single most 
important concept is that of relative computability to relate incomputable 
objects. (Soare 2009: 59) 
Everyday mathematics leads us unavoidably to incomputable objects. 
(Cooper 2004: 1) 
“ undecidability and incompleteness are everywhere in mathematics” 
Chatin, Costa , Doria; 2012: xiii)  
Many sub problems, often highly technical were and are still explored in various sub 
fields of what still is named “theory of computation” even if many of the problems dealt 
with would classically fall into the “ uncomputable” problems. 13Typical exemples are the 
word problem, the “productive sets of the diophantise equations”.  
 But the question of non-computation was recently awaken by Penrose (1989) and 
Kieu (2008) who explored it in the quantic field. And other types of physical foundations 
have been explored under the name of hypercomputation14: A subfield that has taken many 
rich but highly debatable orientations. But we will not pursue them here.  
 « Hypercomputation typically refers to systems that can compute non-
recursive functions, but one also talks of super-Turing systems, which do not 
                                                 
13 We should use the term \recursive” to mean \defined inductively” not \calculable” or 
\computable.” The subject is called \Computability Theory” not \Recursive Function Theory” or 
\Recursion Theory.”( Soares, 2009: 58) 
14 Here are a few more of these definitions of hypercomputation. 
Hypercomputation is the computation of functions or numbers that cannot be computed in the sense 
of Turing i.e. cannot be computed with paper and pencil in a finite number of steps by a human clerk 
working effectively. (Copeland :2002: 489  
Hypercomputation theory is the theory of any device or devices whose calculating properties exceed 
those of any Turing machine, or equivalently which exceeds the computing power of partial 
recursive functions, formalconstructs which derive from the above-mentioned papers by Kleene, 
Church and Turing. Doria   and  all 2006: 1 
 Hypercomputation typically refers to systems that can compute non-recursive functions, but one 
also talks of super-Turing systems, which do not necessarily compute anything non-recursive, but 
which nonetheless outperform Turing machines in terms of complexity or other measures Stannett 
2006:9 
Computation fails as an explanatory notion for mind, the critics claim, because computation, 
assumed to be defined solely in abstract syntactic terms, necessarily neglects the real-time, 
embodied, real-world constraints with which cognitive systems intrinsically cope. ( Scheutz , 2002: 
4 ) 
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necessarily compute anything non-recursive, but which nonetheless 
outperform Turing machines in terms of complexity or other measures 
(Stannett 2006, 8) 
  
Soare’s interpretation 
 Recently, Soare (1996, 2006, 2009 etc. ) -an important contributor on the theory of 
computation- proposed a relatively original understanding of the notion of oracle and 
relative computability for a theory of computation. One that can explain how a computer 
can easily compute “ a non-computable function “! And this understanding gives quite a 
renewal of the role of the computational model for theories of cognition.  
 According to Soare, the Oracle in a Turing machine is itself a partial computable 
function. 15 Its input comes from a A-Machine which is processing a computable or non-
computable function. And this oracle function itself, instead of being defined recursively, 
can be defined extensionally that is by the means of its graph. So, when a A-machine is 
processing a non-computable function and it encounters a problem for one of its input 
value-x, it can consult the Oracle by presenting it this value x. And the oracle can give its 
own answer-y to this value-x. An answer that it found in the graph of the oracle function 
which is a list of the possible solutions given in a form of a list where each xi is paired to 
some value yi. And this answer of the Oracle allows the A-machine to continue and 
eventually to halt.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE I  
 
Figure 1 : The Oracle as a list in a O machine 
Now, from another point of view we can see this list as an external data base that any 
A-machine can consult. More so, this external database can itself be seen as a possible 
environment in which they A machine operates and can consult.  
                                                 
15 The Turing oracle program eP  takes some oracle A and defines  
a partial A-computable functional 
𝑒
𝐴 (𝑥) = 𝑦 }” Soares :2009: 21 
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In real world computing the oracle may be called a database or an 
environment. “the oracle may be called a database or an environment. ” 
(Soares 2009: 41) 
One immediate consequence of this reading of the Oracle as a data base, is that the 
combination of the O-machine with an A-machine is richer than the classical A-machine. 
A computational machine is no more a closed machine. An A-machine can now can consult 
or interact with something different than itself in order to continue its processing.  
This is where this interpretation becomes interesting for a theory of cognition. The 
data base-oracle, being external to the A-machine can be anything where is stored 
information that can be consulted by an A machine! And one of these external oracles can 
simply be embedded in the environment or any other form of informational sources. It can 
for instance be in an external hard disk memory, be on line, or even more simply be in 
another machine in its environment.  
In summary, in this model of computation, a Turing machine, that is, an A-machine, 
is now changed into a O-machine which is an A-machine plus a Oracle. The A-machine 
can always process a classical computational function. But if it is confronted to a non-
computable, or non-recursive function, it may the consult the oracle so that a solution can 
be found. And this oracle can be external to the A-machine.  
Relation to representation  
Let us now come back to our original problem: the question of representation. Can 
this refurbished concept of computation have any impact on the computational theory of 
cognition? We can briefly see two impacts of this refurbished model.  
  
The first impact pertains to the “openness” of cognition. In this perspective, if a 
computational A+0 machine is not a closed system as is an A-machine, then, this allows to 
model cognition as an open system. A cognitive agent can, in a problematic situation call 
upon an “Oracle” which in turn can take many forms: It could be a an internal memory 
built out of past experiences. But it could also be evolution.  More so it could the body, or 
any other artifacts. The means that the brains may not be the only material carrier of 
information on which cognition may rely. More so, a mind could interact with environment 
in which it finds solutions to some of the problems it seeks to solve. And this environment 
is not limited to “physical” nature. It can also take the form of be others minds! In other 
words, a cognitive agent, not being a closed system may inhabit a word with which it 
interacts. And this world can be nature but it could also be other human beings.  
The second impact pertains to the “flexibility ” of rationality that a theory of 
cognition should offer. In this perspective, an A+O-machine does not require the 
processing of information to be as stringent as the classical model is : that is it does not 
require pure atomicity, systematicity, productivity, sequentiality. If there is some cognitive 
operation that can be seen as “ language” (Fodor 1975) that is a “ regular language” or a 
Turing machine, the O machine allows also to see that many operations can deal with 
“exceptions”. More so, it could process by trial and error, as Putnam (1965) saw it. For 
Gandy (1980), computation may even be parallel, allowing then new emergent dynamical 
connections and forms.  In other words, a computational model of cognition is not limited 
to process only discrete and linear inputs. Hence, the systematicity and productivity are not 
essential dimensions of computation as Fodor and Pylyshyn have maintained. More so, if 
an O-machine is not constrained to only pure classical “computational” tasks that is, if it 
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can also deal with “non-computational” ones, this means that cognition would not be 
limited to pure “grammatical” operations. In other words, its operations are not necessarily 
always grounded only in a pure “rationality”. 16Chances are that these types of operations 
are common. We believe that they are the most important and commons tasks a mind has 
to deal with in a daily basis.  
Still, there are some questions that the refurbished theory of computation seems to 
have difficulty coping with : How are these representations or symbols in a list themselves 
grounded (Harnad 1990)? How can it help us understand the question of consciousness, 
self-identity etc. Bringjord and Zenzen (2005) seem to believe that it offer pertinent 
answers.  
 In conclusion, because it gives place to relative computability, this revisited 
computational model of cognition may help us understand mind as something else than a 
closed automatic system embedded in algorithms and grammars. It also gives place to 
creativity, natural interaction, trial and error learning. Because it can deal with both with 
“computable” and “non-computational” tasks it can also help us better a better 
understanding of rationality but  also of irrationality.  
__________________________________________________________ 
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